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Abstract: 
The objective of this research is to investigate the situation of the poor in Morocco through 
assessing the implicit charges of informal housing transactions in different cities.  A model 
allowing the calculation of the implicit interest rate from the traditional-mortgage transactions is 
applied. Data about traditional-mortgage housing transactions, duration, and rental values are 
collected from a sample of households in different cities. The results reveal that these 
transactions are costly although they involve small amounts of money. On average, a rate higher 
than 6% but lower than 50 % is implicitly implied in traditional-mortgage transactions. The 
overall results confirm that poor households are implicitly charged higher interest rates in their 
housing transactions in comparison with the explicit rates charged by formal credit markets, 
including microfinance.  This implies that administrative and economic policies are to be further 
developed to ensure that poor households can easily access formal credit markets.  
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Introduction 
Poor people satisfy their financial needs through other channels that could be informal. Despite 
some differences, many financial practices are shared by the poor around the world. These 
transactions take place in informal setting, and most of the time, they occur between a lender and 
a borrower. The borrower does not often have other options than accepting the terms set by the 
lender who is in need of housing and does not have other alternatives. As these transactions 
involve direct or indirect monetary exchange over time, the implicit costs of borrowing and 
lending are often revealed without reference to an explicit and known interest rate. 
 While these types of informal financial transactions exist all over the world, they are also 
common practices in the poorest neighborhoods and cities of Morocco. El Abdaimi (1990) 
suggests that, in the city of Marrakech, 4% of houses are occupied using traditional-mortgage 
contracts. Mansouri and Ziki (2005) provides a description of this transaction considered as a 
pseudo-mortgage where the owner of the mortgaged premise benefits in compensation from a 
small amount of money disbursed by “the renter” in addition to a smaller rent than the one 
prevailing on the market, over the period of the pseudo-mortgage. 
 
This study focuses on the financial transactions related to traditional and informal housing 
operations in Morocco. The transaction involves small amounts of money borrowed by a house 
or room owner against access of the lender to residency for a given period of time. This social 
transaction is such that a person lends an amount of money to a house owner in exchange for 
occupying that place during an agreed upon period of time. In addition, the renter pays a monthly 
rent that is low in comparison to the market value. At the end of the contract period, the 
borrowed amount is paid back to the lender in total. The renter does not have the right to live in 
the house anymore after closing this contract. The implied interest in this transaction resides in 
occupying the house without paying the real market value of rent against a monetary sum that is 
recuperated by the end of the period.  
 
The motivations behind the practice of traditional mortgage are multiple. This transaction is said 
to be a principal financing source for micro-entrepreneurs in housing sector (Mansouri and Ziki, 
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2005). Also, another driver is the fact that many houses are in irregular administrative situation, 
most often, because of inheritance issues as El Abdaimi (1990) claims.  
The objective of the current research is to assess the implicit interest rates involved in traditional 
and informal transactions taking place in a poor housing context. The persons involved in such 
transactions may wrongfully think that interest rate is not considered because it is not explicitly 
disclosed. But, there is an implicit interest rate in those operations as they involve time and 
money lending throughout time periods. Moreover, those informal transactions are not specific to 
a given country and locations but practiced around the world. In such contexts, it is believed that 
the poor is charged higher rates relative to those set by formal markets and in comparison to the 
non-poor. This study focuses on informal housing transactions in some cities of Morocco that 
represent a kind of “mortgage” process related to access to traditional housing.  
The current paper is composed of four sections. While the first one is a literature review, the 
second addresses the theoretical model to be used for the assessment of the implicit interest rate. 
The third and fourth sections are respectively devoted to data, the empirical applications, and 
results with discussion.  
I. Literature Review 
 
Besides the high costs of access to most goods and services, the poorest segments of the 
population face high implicit charges while looking at financial transactions. Most of them are 
conducted outside the formal financial and banking institutions and are therefore informal.  
Poor households and individuals also face higher costs when willing to contract loans. Because 
of higher expected risks, lenders may demand collateral and guaranties or charge high interest 
rates. The availability of financial institutions and individual lenders willing to conduct credit 
with poor households and individuals is another factor that leads to high costs of credit. Because 
the majority of lenders are located in major cities, the poor has to move to the bank. This creates 
some other expenses. Credit file expenses also add up to increase the costs associated with credit 
granting. In addition, the risk of insolvability of borrowers is seen as a risk that may aggravate 
their poverty level.   
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Poor households and individuals are exposed to high income risk. This risk is originated from 
frequent climatic and economic policy shocks that increase the vulnerability of households to 
severe hardships. Examples of these shocks include but not limited to poor harvest due to 
drought and floods and unexpected additional expenses encountered because of variations in 
economic policies imposed by the country. But as pointed out in many studies held in this 
framework, the nature and types of shocks vary in time and intensity depending on the efforts of 
developing countries to deal with such issues. It is this variation that determines the level of 
impact and the policies developed by poor individuals to overcome these shocks (Dercon, 2002).  
Dercon (2002) also pointed out that there are two types of income risks faced by poor individuals 
and households. Given their aggregate nature, common risks impact all the individuals in a given 
community or region. Idiosyncratic or individual risks affect a particular member of the society. 
In reality, not many research dealt exactly with interest rate of financial transactions in the 
context of poverty.  Mendoza (2011) introduces the concept of poverty penalty as "the relatively 
higher cost shouldered by the poor, when compared to the non-poor, in their participation in 
certain markets".   
Banerjee et al., (2010) reveal that micro credits have positive impact on residents of poor Indian 
district and that many new businesses are launched based on micro credits.  
Lawrence (1991) studies the interpersonal preferences of poor and rich households and argues 
that, in a given age group, rich households are more patient than the non-poor as he finds that 
there is a negative correlation between household income and time preference.  
Bart (2008) stresses the noticeable growth in financial services and examines their effects on 
customers involved in pay-day loans.  
Duflo and Banerjee (2010) analyze market development in relation to micro-credits. The main 
finding is that the disadvantaged people are willing to apply for micro-credits even though they 
are charged excessive interest rates.  
Bhattacharjee (2010) is primarily concerned by determining the causes why interest rates, 
charged by moneylenders, are higher in the less developed areas in comparisons to more 
developed ones. The author finds that 50% of surveyed borrowers are using informal lending 
agencies, in which they assume usurious interest rates of more than 30%. However, these high 
interests vary with areas. They get lower when the geographic area is more developed.  
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Meenakchi (2009) tries to examine the extent of indebtedness of households in West Bengal with 
emphasis on credit accessibility and factors leading to interest rates variation, especially in the 
informal sector. This has revealed that the poor in urban areas face greater problems to get loans 
either from formal or informal sources.  
Regarding the Moroccan context, Alaoui Moustain (2002) wrote a paper to explore the 
relationship between microfinance, in Moroccan poverty context, and the sustainable social and 
economic development. One of the main findings of the study is that micro credits intended for 
creating self-owned microenterprises lead to an increase in the income of the poor. Furthermore, 
this study reveals that microfinance institutions’ claim of charging constant interest rates is not 
thoroughly correct. As a proposed solution to the issue of charging different rates to different 
clients, the paper came up with the solution of using the initial income of the borrower and the 
ROI (return on investment) of the financed project to determine the interest rate to be charged. 
The author claimed that charging higher rates for people with high initial income and who hold 
high ROI projects would increase funds availability to provide additional loans to the needy.  
Regarding interest rate in housing transactions, the research by Mansouri and Ziki (2005) is 
important as the topic is not fully explored, especially in the context of Morocco.  
II. Theoretical model 
The objective is to assess the implicit interest rates that prevail in transactions involving an initial 
amount of money or equivalent (M) against direct payments or benefits made at times 0, 1, 
2,…..n. These can be understood as days, weeks or months. But, in some traditional transactions 
in real estate, people with limited resources can own M but need to be housed at a monthly rent 
(r) with a market rent R. The house owner takes M and receives (r) against renting at R over n 
periods. Under these circumstances, all happens as if the house owner borrows the amount (M) 
against providing (R-r) to the lender each time during the n periods. It is assumed that the market 
interest rate that is prevailing in the area and in similar transactions is (m) for each period under 
consideration. The implicit interest rate (i) related to this transaction can be derived as the 
present value of the stream of payments over M. 
The present value (PV) related to the stream of payments under the above assumption is given 
by: 
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Besides that, larger values of n lead to: 
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It is clear from the above relationships that “i” is a function of m and it is sometimes useful to 
compare i to m through looking at the sign of the expression: 
( ) (1 (1/ )) (1/ )(1 ) ni m m m m m −− = − + + − +  
This requires the finding of the zero of the above equation as the function i(m) is a strictly 
decreasing function of m. This is similar at looking at the intersection of i(m) curve and the 45 
degree line in an (i, m) graph.  
There is definitely a single value m* above which the implicit interest rate is below the on-going 
market interest rate and below which the implicit interest rate is higher.  
These values indicate that in the interval ]0, 1], there is no intersection between the curves of i 
and this happens at values of m higher than m*. This says that the prevailing implicit interest 
rates are higher than the ones provided by the market.  
 
III. Empirical methods & data 
This part is devoted to reveal the methods that were used to gather data necessary for this 
research about traditional mortgage, micro-lending, and the determinants that push the poor to 
accept high rates in informal transactions. 
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Firstly, the choice of several cities in Morocco as a research area regarding the traditional-
mortgage transaction is justified by the requirement of investigating the situation in many 
locations. A report of the World Bank about the geographic distribution of poverty in Morocco 
(2004) indicates that the selected places exhibit higher poverty rates 24 to 37 percent in some 
locations. The selected regions are Ifrane, Azrou, Salé, Marrakech and Meknes.   
Besides that, lack of financial resources for most of the population creates the belief that the 
traditional-mortgage would be a very efficient way to ensure housing with reasonable cost while 
making locked saving. The expansion of the traditional-mortgage phenomena is also explained 
by other factors such as the growing rural exodus, hence, an increasing demand for housing. 
Also, lack of identification papers for an important portion of the population added to the 
irregular situation of many properties make it hard for people to conduct the common 
transactions of buying or renting houses in this region.  
Collecting data concerning traditional-mortgage transaction was not an easy task at all. When 
asked, it has been noticed that people tend to avoid talking about that topic as they are afraid 
from being implied in problems, especially that this transaction has no legal status at all. After 
many efforts of explaining that this investigation has absolutely nothing to do with any state 
related parties, but it is purely intended to academic research, we were able to collect data about 
191 observations from four different cities (Ifrane-Azrou, Salé, Marrakech, and Meknes). In 
front of difficulty of collecting data, the investigator contacted some housing brokers; some of 
them provided no information while others provided up to four examples of traditional-mortgage 
transaction in which they were the intermediaries.  
The questions that were asked concern mainly whether or not the respondent occupies a house 
using the traditional-mortgage. If the answer is yes, then further questions about the amount 
loaned in the transaction (M), the amount of monthly rent (r), and an estimation of the market 
rental value of the property (R). Regarding data about monthly discount rate (m), it is from 
secondary sources, mainly from the website of the Moroccan central bank. 
The table in the appendix shows the collected data about M, r, and R from observations collected 
from the four Moroccan cities as well as the calculated interest rates calculated using the 
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constructed model. Collected data have been arranged in a chronological manner depending on 
the date in which traditional mortgage contracts took place. 
IV.  Empirical analysis & results: 
 
Within the 0 and 1 interval, the possible monthly discount rate (m) values are assessed as 
intersection point between i(m), for a given period (n) and a given (k), and the 45 degrees where 
i(m)=m where the market rate (m) equals the implicit rate i(m). This intersection is given by  m* 
as given below under different values of K.  
K values m* 
0.02 13% 
0.03 17% 
0.04 21% 
0.05 24% 
0.06 27% 
0.07 29% 
0.08 32% 
0.09 35% 
0.1 37% 
0.11 40% 
 
The m* value is critical in a sense that it is the only value where the monthly discount rate is 
equal to implicit rate of the traditional mortgage transaction. Since   is a positive 
number, higher values of k lead to an upward movement of the graph of i(m) to the right which 
results in higher implicit rates from the transaction and also a higher m*.  
More importantly, if the monthly market rate happens to be greater than m*, the renter does not 
benefit from a traditional mortgage as i then becomes lower than market rate m. whereas, when 
m is below m*, the traditional mortgage transaction is said to be beneficial for the renter as 
i>>m.  
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As has been noted earlier, the Moroccan banking system finances a full range of sectors. 
Housing is one sector heavily served by Moroccan banks because it requires huge money either 
to invest in or acquire a title. One important point is about the fact that Moroccan banks charge 
two different types of housing credit; the rate applied could be either fixed or variable depending 
on clients’ choice. Variable rate follows fluctuations of referential indices and could either 
decrease leading to low cost of debt, or the contrary. In 2011, when a Moroccan bank allocates a 
housing loan for particulars, fixed rate loans approximate rates of 6.5%, while variable rates 
begin at around 5.5%, excluding taxes and fees. The fixed rate is going to be used for 
comparison aim. In real life practice, the client is not only charged the market rate. Other fees 
such as transaction fees and required life insurance amount to approximately 1% of amount of 
loan on the burden of the client.  
Housing rates in Morocco have significantly decreased throughout the last decade. Different 
sources point out that 15% to 20% rates prevailed before the 1990s. Contemporary data about the 
rates charged by banks in housing sector are available from the website of the Moroccan central 
bank. The general trend in housing sector is that rates charged have become more affordable. 
The mean value of housing rate is 6% with a very low variation. Hence, estimated implicit rates 
from traditional mortgage transaction are going to be compared to 6% to determine if they are 
more costly.  
When applying the developed model on the collected data, implicit rates from traditional 
mortgage transaction are determined. The average implicit rate from the sample of 191 
observations from the four cities is 30% over the contract period. Further, the average monthly 
implicit rate from traditional mortgage transaction is 1%/month. Also, the calculation of implicit 
rate from traditional-mortgage transaction where variables M, r, R, and n are the average values 
from the data sample. 
M r R n K i(m) i(m) per month 
99571 299 1235 36 0.0094 31% 1% 
 
The rate of 31% is the total rate implicitly gained by the renter over the whole period of 
traditional-mortgage transaction. The monthly rate for these average values is 1% monthly which 
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is a high rate than 0.5% (6% annually) that is charged by formal banks. Only 5% of implicit rates 
calculated for the observations were equal or slightly lower than bank rate of 0.5% monthly.   
From field work, it has been noticed that real estate owners who use traditional-mortgage 
transaction are generally micro-entrepreneurs with portfolios of no more than 2 to 3 low standing 
houses. The raised funds are used by those micro-entrepreneurs to financing building a new 
house. Mansouri and Ziki (2005) also revealed that 60% of Marrakech house owners involved in 
traditional-mortgage use borrowed money to finance investment activities in housing sector. The 
empirical results reveal that the traditional-mortgage instrument is wrongfully thought of to be a 
cheap financing instrument. This is because the renter (the one lending money) explicitly charges 
higher rates than those that would be charged by formal financial sources.   
The obtained implicit rates for every city need to be compared. A t -test for comparison is 
implemented. It appears that there is no statistically significant difference between means of the 
implicit rates from the four different cities. All the t-statistics reported are very low. The 
following table summarizes these findings.   
Reported t-test for comparing means between cities 
 Azrou & 
Ifrane 
Marrakech Salé Meknes 
Azrou & Ifrane ------ 0.22743 0.0916 0.42061 
Marrakech  ------ 0.05857 0.22278 
Salé   ------ 0.2749 
Meknes    ------ 
  
 
V. Discussion 
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The transaction that has been explored by this study is the traditional-mortgage. Exclusively 
related to housing sector and practiced mainly by the poor, this highly used way of providing 
financing is very costly for the borrower. This transaction involves explicit lending of money, 
and a cost related to that as a result. However, this interest is explicitly received. The renter, who 
lends the money, receives interest on the form of a low paid rent in comparison to market rental 
value. Real estate owner, who is the borrower, uses the raised funds to finance other investments, 
in housing sector most of the time as the literature indicates. The cost of money for the real estate 
owner has been shown in this study to be greater than other sources of financing, namely, 
commercial banks loans. As has been empirically displayed, monthly rates charged in traditional-
mortgage transaction reach 30% on average over the contract period. This is especially true when 
amount lent (M) and paid rent (r) are low while the market rental value (R) is high. Moreover, 
these findings can be generalized to the whole country (Morocco). This is because comparison of 
sample means from the four different cities showed that they are not statistically different from 
each other at a confidence level of 95%.  
These results show that the common belief, among practitioners, that traditional-mortgage is a 
cheap way of borrowing money, is actually wrong. This belief is nothing but a social illusion. On 
an average traditional-mortgage transaction, the amount of money borrowed is not very 
significant.  
Relating to rates charged by conventional banks, these are said to be the lowest. However, poor people 
don’t have access to them most of the time. Even though these rates fluctuate, they don’t reach 
unreasonable levels. Generally, they don’t exceed much 6% annual interest. In 1995, the charged rate by 
banks was around 15% with a decreasing trend; in 2007, this rate does not exceed 6%.  
More importantly, comparison of borrowing cost for the poor around the world shows those latter bear 
excessive costs. It is hard to come up with a global average of interest rates charged in traditional 
mortgage instrument. This is because not many research explored the topic despite its omnipresence 
around the world. Our study revealed that real estate owners bear rates approaching 40% when raising 
money through traditional-mortgage.  
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Conclusion: 
The main finding in this study is that borrowing money through traditional-mortgage is highly 
costly. The charged rates in this financial instrument are of 40% on average for amounts of 
money that are relatively low.  
The concepts and results of this study will serve to have a better understanding of informal 
market that is exclusively frequented by the poor. Moreover, this study is said to be an 
introductory phase for exploring further financing instruments occurring in poverty context. 
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Appendix: Data 
 
 M r R n K i(m) i(m)/month 
 100000 500 1300 48 0.008 33.6% 0.7% 
Azrou & Ifrane 50000 200 1300 24 0.022 50.8% 2.1% 
 140000 400 1300 60 0.0064286 32.3% 0.5% 
 70000 150 1200 24 0.015 34.7% 1.4% 
 50000 150 1000 36 0.017 55.9% 1.6% 
 60000 200 1100 36 0.015 49.4% 1.4% 
 30000 150 800 24 0.0216667 50.1% 2.1% 
 40000 200 900 36 0.0175 57.6% 1.6% 
 30000 150 700 24 0.0183333 42.4% 1.8% 
 100000 400 1000 36 0.006 19.7% 0.5% 
 40000 200 750 24 0.01375 31.8% 1.3% 
 60000 0 1200 36 0.02 65.8% 1.8% 
 20000 100 600 12 0.025 31.2% 2.6% 
 40000 250 1000 36 0.01875 61.7% 1.7% 
 30000 150 700 12 0.0183333 22.9% 1.9% 
 70000 300 1500 24 0.0171429 39.6% 1.7% 
 20000 100 600 12 0.025 31.2% 2.6% 
 50000 250 1300 24 0.021 48.5% 2.0% 
 30000 200 750 24 0.0183333 42.4% 1.8% 
 60000 400 1200 24 0.0133333 30.8% 1.3% 
 30000 200 700 12 0.0166667 20.8% 1.7% 
 40000 800 1500 12 0.0175 21.9% 1.8% 
 70000 500 2000 24 0.0214286 49.5% 2.1% 
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 80000 400 1500 12 0.01375 17.2% 1.4% 
 110000 500 2000 36 0.0136364 44.9% 1.2% 
 30000 200 800 24 0.02 46.2% 1.9% 
 40000 500 1400 24 0.0225 52.0% 2.2% 
 50000 500 1500 12 0.02 25.0% 2.1% 
 160000 250 1500 24 0.0078125 18.1% 0.8% 
 30000 0 500 12 0.0166667 20.8% 1.7% 
 10000 350 1200 24 0.085 196.4% 8.2% 
 50000 200 900 24 0.014 32.4% 1.3% 
 30000 0 600 24 0.02 46.2% 1.9% 
 70000 300 1000 12 0.01 12.5% 1.0% 
 60000 300 900 24 0.01 23.1% 1.0% 
 100000 500 1200 36 0.007 23.0% 0.6% 
 80000 300 800 24 0.00625 14.4% 0.6% 
 60000 300 1300 12 0.0166667 20.8% 1.7% 
 20000 100 550 12 0.0225 28.1% 2.3% 
 90000 300 800 24 0.0055556 12.8% 0.5% 
 50000 300 700 36 0.008 26.3% 0.7% 
 70000 400 1100 12 0.01 12.5% 1.0% 
 150000 0 750 60 0.005 25.2% 0.4% 
 60000 50 300 48 0.0041667 17.5% 0.4% 
 100000 0 500 48 0.005 21.0% 0.4% 
 20000 0 150 24 0.0075 17.3% 0.7% 
 80000 0 375 48 0.0046875 19.7% 0.4% 
 160000 0 600 60 0.00375 18.9% 0.3% 
 10000 0 50 12 0.005 6.2% 0.5% 
 40000 0 200 12 0.005 6.2% 0.5% 
 70000 0 200 24 0.0028571 6.6% 0.3% 
 70000 0 200 24 0.0028571 6.6% 0.3% 
 30000 0 150 36 0.005 16.5% 0.5% 
 50000 0 250 24 0.005 11.6% 0.5% 
 40000 0 300 24 0.0075 17.3% 0.7% 
 150000 0 650 36 0.0043333 14.3% 0.4% 
 50000 0 400 12 0.008 10.0% 0.8% 
 90000 0 250 60 0.0027778 14.0% 0.2% 
 30000 200 800 12 0.02 25.0% 2.1% 
 25000 150 150 24 0 0.0% 0.0% 
 60000 60 500 60 0.0073333 36.9% 0.6% 
 60000 250 500 48 0.0041667 17.5% 0.4% 
 50000 150 500 48 0.007 29.4% 0.6% 
 50000 150 500 24 0.007 16.2% 0.7% 
 20000 50 200 12 0.0075 9.4% 0.8% 
 70000 250 500 24 0.0035714 8.3% 0.3% 
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 40000 300 900 24 0.015 34.7% 1.4% 
 10000 150 750 24 0.06 138.7% 5.8% 
 20000 100 1000 12 0.045 56.2% 4.7% 
 40000 100 350 24 0.00625 14.4% 0.6% 
 70000 150 400 24 0.0035714 8.3% 0.3% 
 25000 0 150 24 0.006 13.9% 0.6% 
 20000 100 1000 18 0.045 80.6% 4.5% 
 60000 300 300 60 0 0.0% 0.0% 
 20000 0 125 24 0.00625 14.4% 0.6% 
 70000 0 400 24 0.0057143 13.2% 0.6% 
 70000 0 350 60 0.005 25.2% 0.4% 
 15000 30 600 12 0.038 47.5% 4.0% 
 40000 250 700 24 0.01125 26.0% 1.1% 
 60000 0 600 24 0.01 23.1% 1.0% 
 30000 0 500 24 0.0166667 38.5% 1.6% 
 70000 100 500 24 0.0057143 13.2% 0.6% 
 60000 250 1000 36 0.0125 41.1% 1.1% 
 70000 0 500 60 0.0071429 35.9% 0.6% 
 40000 0 600 24 0.015 34.7% 1.4% 
 30000 0 300 24 0.01 23.1% 1.0% 
 120000 0 500 24 0.0041667 9.6% 0.4% 
 20000 50 500 24 0.0225 52.0% 2.2% 
 40000 0 850 48 0.02125 89.2% 1.9% 
 35000 100 700 36 0.0171429 56.4% 1.6% 
 20000 0 400 12 0.02 25.0% 2.1% 
 20000 0 600 24 0.03 69.3% 2.9% 
 30000 0 300 36 0.01 32.9% 0.9% 
 50000 0 900 60 0.018 90.6% 1.5% 
 30000 0 750 60 0.025 125.8% 2.1% 
 20000 300 1000 24 0.035 80.9% 3.4% 
 25000 100 700 24 0.024 55.5% 2.3% 
 15000 0 400 36 0.0266667 87.8% 2.4% 
 40000 0 450 24 0.01125 26.0% 1.1% 
 25000 0 400 24 0.016 37.0% 1.5% 
 80000 0 800 60 0.01 50.3% 0.8% 
 10000 100 300 12 0.02 25.0% 2.1% 
Meknes 100000 350 1300 24 0.0095 22.0% 0.9% 
 50000 250 750 24 0.01 23.1% 1.0% 
 120000 600 2000 24 0.011667 27.0% 1.1% 
 55000 300 1400 12 0.02 25.0% 2.1% 
 40000 400 1000 36 0.015 49.4% 1.4% 
 7000 50 200 6 0.021429 14.7% 2.5% 
 70000 500 1500 24 0.014286 33.0% 1.4% 
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 90000 700 1500 24 0.008889 20.5% 0.9% 
 250000 1000 4000 36 0.012 39.5% 1.1% 
 110000 300 900 24 0.005455 12.6% 0.5% 
 250000 500 2500 24 0.008 18.5% 0.8% 
 10000 200 600 12 0.04 50.0% 4.2% 
 40000 300 1100 24 0.02 46.2% 1.9% 
 80000 500 1400 24 0.01125 26.0% 1.1% 
 100000 400 1700 24 0.013 30.0% 1.3% 
 200000 700 2000 24 0.0065 15.0% 0.6% 
 50000 200 800 36 0.012 39.5% 1.1% 
 180000 800 3000 36 0.012222 40.2% 1.1% 
 15000 150 500 24 0.023333 53.9% 2.2% 
 120000 0 2100 24 0.0175 40.4% 1.7% 
 90000 200 1800 24 0.017778 41.1% 1.7% 
 60000 600 1200 24 0.01 23.1% 1.0% 
 68000 300 1000 36 0.010294 33.9% 0.9% 
 800000 2000 6000 36 0.005 16.5% 0.5% 
 100000 300 1300 24 0.01 23.1% 1.0% 
 80000 500 1700 24 0.015 34.7% 1.4% 
 10000 600 1500 24 0.09 208.0% 8.7% 
 130000 500 2000 36 0.011538 38.0% 1.1% 
 85000 400 1500 12 0.012941 16.2% 1.3% 
 300000 1000 4000 36 0.01 32.9% 0.9% 
 150000 800 2000 24 0.008 18.5% 0.8% 
 70000 200 900 12 0.01 12.5% 1.0% 
 180000 0 1700 24 0.009444 21.8% 0.9% 
 30000 300 750 24 0.015 34.7% 1.4% 
Marrakech 60000 400 1200 36 0.013333 43.9% 1.2% 
 300000 2000 7000 36 0.016667 54.8% 1.5% 
 40000 800 1500 12 0.0175 21.9% 1.8% 
 70000 500 1000 24 0.007143 16.5% 0.7% 
 20000 250 700 36 0.0225 74.0% 2.1% 
 550000 900 2500 24 0.002909 6.7% 0.3% 
 30000 200 700 12 0.016667 20.8% 1.7% 
 150000 500 1600 24 0.007333 16.9% 0.7% 
 100000 250 1200 36 0.0095 31.3% 0.9% 
 3000000 3000 25000 36 0.007333 24.1% 0.7% 
 120000 500 1500 24 0.008333 19.3% 0.8% 
 100000 300 1000 24 0.007 16.2% 0.7% 
 160000 700 2000 24 0.008125 18.8% 0.8% 
 20000 100 400 12 0.015 18.7% 1.6% 
 60000 0 700 24 0.011667 27.0% 1.1% 
 110000 350 900 24 0.005 11.6% 0.5% 
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 150000 600 1300 12 0.004667 5.8% 0.5% 
 20000 400 1500 36 0.055 181.0% 5.0% 
 15000 0 400 12 0.026667 33.3% 2.8% 
 120000 400 2000 24 0.013333 30.8% 1.3% 
 100000 200 1300 24 0.011 25.4% 1.1% 
 65000 0 700 12 0.010769 13.5% 1.1% 
 130000 600 1700 12 0.008462 10.6% 0.9% 
 140000 400 1500 36 0.007857 25.9% 0.7% 
 100000 500 2000 24 0.015 34.7% 1.4% 
 78000 350 900 24 0.007051 16.3% 0.7% 
Salé 100000 400 1300 12 0.009 11.2% 0.9% 
 400000 1000 3700 36 0.00675 22.2% 0.6% 
 100000 300 1500 24 0.012 27.7% 1.2% 
 200000 600 2000 36 0.007 23.0% 0.6% 
 140000 250 1500 24 0.008929 20.6% 0.9% 
 50000 0 700 12 0.014 17.5% 1.5% 
 130000 450 1600 24 0.008846 20.4% 0.9% 
 80000 250 1000 12 0.009375 11.7% 1.0% 
 100000 700 1200 12 0.005 6.2% 0.5% 
 20000 0 300 12 0.015 18.7% 1.6% 
 100000 350 1500 24 0.0115 26.6% 1.1% 
 300000 800 2500 36 0.005667 18.6% 0.5% 
 90000 100 800 24 0.007778 18.0% 0.7% 
 120000 0 1100 36 0.009167 30.2% 0.8% 
 100000 600 1300 24 0.007 16.2% 0.7% 
 160000 700 2000 48 0.008125 34.1% 0.7% 
 70000   700 12 0.01 12.5% 1.0% 
 85000 400 1000 24 0.007059 16.3% 0.7% 
 130000 600 1500 24 0.006923 16.0% 0.7% 
 65000 500 1000 12 0.007692 9.6% 0.8% 
 170000 0 2000 24 0.011765 27.2% 1.1% 
 350000 500 2700 24 0.006286 14.5% 0.6% 
 25000 0 400 24 0.016 37.0% 1.5% 
 80000 300 1000 48 0.00875 36.7% 0.8% 
 120000 800 2000 12 0.01 12.5% 1.0% 
 200000 1000 2500 24 0.0075 17.3% 0.7% 
 75000 400 1600 36 0.016 52.7% 1.5% 
 35000 0 600 12 0.017143 21.4% 1.8% 
 130000 250 900 24 0.005 11.6% 0.5% 
        
 
 
